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Abstract
Although organic farming is considered the poster child of rural development in Europe, there is little
empirical evidence assessing its success in achieving the ambitious environmental and socio-economic
objectives that it is purported to assist. This paper presents empirical evidence from the growth of
organic farming in Europe over the past two decades that questions the highly optimistic claims of policy
makers. Although policies in support of organic impact have had an overall positive environmental
impact, their social impact is ambiguous, as organic farming appears to have grown more in areas
with larger average farm sizes. Additionally, contrary to what is often assumed, organic farms in Europe
display larger average sizes and lower rates of labor intensity than their conventional counterparts, casting
doubts on the efficacy of organic farms to allow family farmers to remain in the countryside as high-value
producers. I assert that this this development should be viewed as evidence of the “conventionalization”
of organic farming, and suggest that policy makers take into account the transformations of the structures
of production, which benefit from the support for organic farming. Treating the experience of organic
farmers in the EU as a lesson for schemes paying for environmental services, I suggest that the success of
organic farming should be evaluated by the numbers of participating farmers, rather than by area covered,
as has been the predominant approach so far. Finally, I assert that strong agricultural cooperatives are
necessary to secure a long-lasting passage of small farmers to organic methods of production.
1 Introduction
Since the 1992 MacSharry reforms, the European Union has modified its agricultural policy so as to include
payments to farmers for the provision of environmental services and the preservation of nature. Among
agri-environmental measures, payments to the farmers producing under organic methods constitute a major
component of the Second Pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which explicitly focuses on Rural
Development and has been becoming more significant over the last years. Organic production fulfills envi-
ronmental demands by creating less pressure on the ecosystems because of its less intensive methods, while
it contributes to the preservation of the rural landscapes which European urban dwellers view as precious.
It also satisfies consumer concerns around food quality and public health and has positive implications for
animal welfare.
Over the past 20 years, organic farming has experienced rapid growth, transforming the European coun-
tryside. Apart from its health and environmental benefits, it is often viewed as a potential solution for
keeping rural residents in the countryside. Organic farmers receive direct income support for converting
conventional land into organic and (in most countries) even for maintaining it as such. Additionally, high
prices for niche organic commodities are thought of as a way to boost small farmers’ incomes without re-
lying on traditional price supports. Thus, aside from being an attractive solution to the problem of rural
development in the eyes of environmentalists, organic farming promises to relieve the budgetary pressures of
the CAP, fulfilling the wishes of the fiscal conservatives within the EU.
The current paper examines whether these promises are actually being fulfilled. Its structure is as follows:
The second section traces the changes of the CAP, from a set of traditional protectionist measures towards
a document that promotes environmental policy and analyzes the central discursive role of organic farming
in the arsenal of the European Commission for addressing a variety of environmental and social problems.
The third section lays out the data and the empirical methodology, whereas the two subsequent sections
present the necessary statistical evidence in order to commence the process of evaluating the degree to which
these policies have borne fruit for environmental protection and for achieving the social goals of the CAP.
Since the results do not confirm the high expectations surrounding organic farming, especially in achieving
the protection of small farmers, I attempt in the sixth section to place the evidence in context, extending
the discussion of the “conventionalization” of organic farming. The seventh section offers some concluding
remarks.
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2 Agricultural policy in the European Union
2.1 Establishing the industrial mode of agriculture
After WWII, most European government pursued protectionist agricultural policies in order to achieve self-
sufficiency and to tackle balance of payments difficulties1 (Hoggart et al., 1995; Tracy, 1989). In 1955, West
Germany’s Agricultural Act codified the country’s attempts to raise productivity and farm incomes through
the stabilization of agricultural prices and supplies. This latter codification provided the framework for
Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which signified the creation of the European Economic Community
(EEC)(predecessor of the European Union) by Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands (Hoggart et al., 1995, 114-115).
The agricultural sector already held a predominant position in this inaugural document, as can be easily
demonstrated by the fact that it lays out the original objectives of the CAP of the EEC. These were:
• to increase agricultural productivity
• to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community
• to stabilize markets
• to assure the availability of supplies
• to ensure reasonable prices for consumers (European Union, 2006, 54).
In order to achieve these goals, the CAP implemented significant payments to support agricultural pro-
duction, in the form of subsidies to direct producers. Price supports were implemented for products in which
the EEC wanted to achieve self-sufficiency, whereas tariffs and levies were imposed on imported products:
72% of agricultural production was receiving both price supports and external protection, whereas 25% was
solely enjoying external protection (Sampson and Yeats, 1977; Commission of the European Communities,
1975).
However, the policies of the CAP led to a series of problems. Subsidies led to mounting agricultural
surpluses in Europe and were primarily channeled towards the largest and most productive arable farms,
creating a highly unequal situation within the agricultural sector. Thus, the initial agricultural policies,
which didn’t specifically target regional imbalances, failed to allow rural residents to participate in the
welfare boost that urban residents experienced after WWII (Joossens and Raw, 1991; Grafen and Schramek,
2000; Groier and Loibl, 2000; Weis, 2007).
1The only exception to the protectionist rule was provided by Denmark, which attempted to win markets through diversifi-
cation of its farm exports and free-trade.
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Since the CAP embraced the productivist logic of the early era of industrial agriculture, it encouraged
specialization and monocropping, which sacrificed natural resistance for productivity. Additionally, genetic
homogeneity decreased the resources and opportunities for natural enemies of pests, increasing reliance on
pesticides. As a large portion of the target weeds, insects and other pests became resistant to the chemicals
used, the need arose for the development of newer pesticides, putting the farmer on a “pesticide treadmill”
(Altieri, 2000).
Intensive agricultural methods led to decreased soil fertility. The answer to that problem was found in
the application of synthetic fertilizers. The latter became available in the global North at very low prices
after WWII, thus permitting farmers to diverge from the use of legume crops for converting atmospheric
nitrogen into forms that plants could use, and thus supplying non-legumes with sufficient fertility (Foster
and Magdoff, 2000, 51-52).
Beyond the private costs of pesticide acquisition, the indirect costs to the environment and public health
have to be taken into account when assessing pesticide and fertilizer use. Groundwater and fishery contam-
ination, impacts on wildlife and other foods, farmers’ poisoning, as well as higher cancer rates are among
the ramifications of higher pesticide use (Altieri, 2000; Allen and Kovach, 2000; Foster and Magdoff, 2000;
Edwards, 1993; Culliney et al., 1993). With respect to fertilizers, one has to point out the high energy inten-
sity of their production process2. Beyond turning agriculture into a high carbon-footprint sector, inorganic
fertilizers were responsible for groundwater and surface water contamination. Since a large amount of nitro-
gen fertilizers is not recovered by the crops, it ends up in the water in nitrate forms, causing eutrophication
(a population explosion of algae, which depletes the oxygen in water systems and upsets ecosystem balance)
and putting human health at risk3. Additionally, nitrogen fertilizers should be viewed as air pollutants, as
they contribute to the destruction of the ozone layer (Altieri, 2000, 82-83).
2.2 The rise of agri-environmental measures
In the 1970s, the “intensive use of certain types of fertilizer and the misuse of pesticides” began to be viewed
in Europe as a source of pollution, especially as pesticide intensification impacted water sources, with serious
consequences for public health (Council of the European Communities, 1973; Andersen et al., 2000; Buller and
Brives, 2000; Louloudis et al., 2000). In the early 1980s, various countries, such as Denmark, the Netherlands,
Austria and the UK, implemented programs which paid farmers for environmentally friendly methods of
2Foster and Magdoff claim that in the US cornbelt, nitrogen fertilizer production accounts for 40% of the necessary energy
to produce an acre of corn (Foster and Magdoff, 2000, 54).
3Several types of cancer, as well as methamoglobinemia (low blood oxygen levels) in children, have been linked to nitrate
uptake (Conway and Pretty, 1991; Altieri, 2000).
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production. The policy targets included promotion of organic farming, reduction of inputs, preservation of
biodiversity, conversion of arable land to grassland and rotation measures, set-aside, landscape preservation
etc4 (Grafen and Schramek, 2000; Groier and Loibl, 2000; Hart and Wilson, 2000).
By 1985, the European Commission would explicitly acknowledge that modern agricultural techniques
were responsible for the extinction of species and for the destruction of valuable ecosystems, while increasing
the risks of ground and surface water pollution (European Commission (1985, 50) as quoted in Lynggaard
(2006, 107)). During the McSharry reform of the CAP in 1992, the above mentioned agri-environmental
schemes, set up by Member States on their own initiative, became “accompanying measures” to the more
traditional price support policies of the CAP. This meant that every country was now required to design
and implement measures for environmental protection in its respective territory, apart from and parallel to
its support for agriculture. Then, in 1999, when the “Agenda 2000” reform of the CAP was implemented,
Rural Development was explicitly designated as the Second Pillar of Agricultural Policy (the First Pillar
being traditional price supports); agri-environmental measures were incorporated into the Second Pillar, so
as to achieve coherence with the other rural development policies, and began to constitute a major compo-
nent in the rhetoric of European policymakers regarding the revitalization of the countryside5 (European
Commission, 2005, 4-8).
The move towards agri-environmental measures was also in line with supporting marginalized communi-
ties, thereby remedying the inequality created by the previous CAP, which favored large arable producers
over small, low-income farmers (Buller et al., 2000, 5). Rural development (independent of agriculture) had
become a prominent policy concern in the European Union after the inclusion of the UK and Denmark
in the EEC, two countries which already had policies in place to address inequality between their regions
(Shucksmith et al., 2005; Buller et al., 2000). Thus, subsidizing farmers for being “good stewards of the
countryside” and providing society with public goods, such as a clean environment and beautiful rural land-
scapes, was viewed as a way of conforming to the guidelines of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), which stipulated the abandonment of protective policies in agriculture, while helping small farm-
ers to stay in the countryside and, thereby, reversing rural depopulation6 (Louloudis and Maraveyas, 1997;
4For a more complete list, see European Commission, 2005.
5Although a complete list of rural development projects would be impossible, some examples of Second Pillar measures
would be subsidies to agro-tourist enterprises, funding for agricultural processing, and payments for preservation of biodiversity.
For examples of rural development projects that were co-financed by the EU, see European Commission (2006).
6Pressure from the farmers themselves to maintain their standard of living should also not be underestimated in the forming of
agricultural policy(van der Ploeg, 2009; Grafen and Schramek, 2000; Buller and Brives, 2000; Groier and Loibl, 2000; Schermer,
2003). However, it should be noted that among farmers, it was farmers in the North, rather than in the South, who were more
present in setting the goals of the revised CAP. As Buller claims, agri-environmental payments benefited primarily farmers in
Germany and Austria, with Sweden, Finland and France close behind. In countries, such as Spain, Italy or Greece, farmers
were mostly “policy-takers” rather than “policy-makers” (Buller, 2000, 244-249).
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Carlsen and Hasund, 2000; Buller and Brives, 2000; Peco et al., 2000; van der Ploeg et al., 2002; Kasimis
and Papadopoulos, 2005).
2.3 Organic farming as Deus ex machina
Organic farming occupies a central position among the different tools of rural development, as it seems
capable of addressing different problems with the CAP. Organic farming was viewed as a solution to intensive
agricultural production and its effects on groundwater pollution or acid rain in various European countries
(e.g. the Netherlands, the UK, Denmark) (Lynggaard, 2006, 134-135). Furthermore, organic farming reduces
the use of energy and agro-chemicals, and contributes to the restoration of an economic and ecological balance,
with favorable implications for human health (Lynggaard, 2006, 113).
In addition to the direct environmental and health benefits, organic farming confered other social bene-
fits. It was seen as protecting rural landscapes, while providing producers with an attractive niche market
opportunity. Hence, the position of the agricultural community wouldn’t deteriorate in an environment of
decreasing public support (European Parliament, 1991; van der Ploeg et al., 2002). Since small farms were
viewed as less likely to implement intensive methods of production, and were in some cases, even already
following them without being recognized as organic producers7, they were viewed as natural candidates for
inclusion into the schemes of organic farming. Hence, organic farming was directly linked by the European’s
Parliament Committee on Agriculture to the support and protection of small-scale farming (Lynggaard,
2006, 127).
Support for organic farming is achieved through legal, communicative and financial instruments8. The
latter include payments to organic farmers for converting their land into organic production, and also, in
most countries, for continuing organic production (that is for maintaining their land under the organic
stipulations). Hence, every organic farmer receives an annual payment for converting their land and, in most
countries, also for maintaining their farm under the organic regulations9.
7This is the type of producers which Altieri calls “organic by default”(Altieri, 1987).
8The array of legal instruments refers to the shifting of the power to define organic farming from the private sector to
government authorities. Hence, the meaning of organic has become disputed and regulated through the use of organic logos,
certification agencies, etc. Communicative instruments are made up of the ways, including research, training, advice, and
promotional campaigns, which support organic producers. Financing expositions of organic products or research on organic
farming, particularly in public universities, would be two examples of the second group of instruments (Stolze and Lampkin,
2009)
9For example, organic farmers growing permanent crops in Germany and in Italy could receive an annual payment of
1,080-1,440 euros per ha (Stolze and Lampkin, 2009, 240).
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2.4 Towards the “conventionalization” of organic farming?
Although these policies receive general support in Europe, not everybody has joined in the optimism about
the transformative character of organic farming. In fact, the “conventionalization” of organic farming has
been highly debated in the literature on organic farming (which mostly comes from the fields of rural
sociology, geography and anthropology). The main pieces in the relevant literature were written by Tovey
(1997) and Buck et al. (1997). Tovey traces the ways through which EU agricultural policy leads organic
agriculture to increasingly resemble conventional processes in Ireland (Tovey, 1997). Buck et al., on the
other hand, claim that the organic farming sector has created an opportunity for agri-business, which can
extract rents and accelerate the process of accumulation through investing in organic farming. Through
regulation (which involved registration with the state and third-party certification), the right to market
produce organically conferred a rent to those having it. Hence, organic farming displays characteristics that
were traditionally associated with conventional forms of agriculture, such as monocultures and long-distance
trading, while labor practices also became increasingly more and more alike. Thereby, “‘organic” becomes
an industry rather than a different philosophy (Buck et al., 1997).
Despite being confirmed by several case studies10, the conventionalization thesis hasn’t become univer-
sally accepted. A special issue of the journal Sociologia Ruralis (Winter 2001) was dedicated to proving it
either false or associating its existence with specific exceptional cases. In order to rebut the claims of conven-
tionalization, its opponents sought to highlight the characteristics of organic farming as a social movement.
Hence, Michelsen claims that both the Californian and the Irish case are associated with a small share of
organic agriculture, rendering generalizations “heroic” (Michelsen, 2001, 6). In the case of New Zealand,
Campbell and Liepins (2001) claim that the development of “organic” as an industry is contested by organic
growers, thereby challenging its potential linear development, whereas Kaltoft (2001) draws similar results
by examining the case of the Danish organic movement.
3 Empirical questions
3.1 Questions and data description
In line with the questions and the promises of organic farming, I proceed to estimate the environmental
and the socio-economic effects of organic farming in the European Union, after almost two decades of policy
10Research by Guthman (1998, 2004) and Allen and Kovach (2000) provided additional evidence to its support.
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support. I suggest that one way of estimating the environmental impact of organic farming would be to
examine the impact of a country’s organic share of agriculture on the country’s pesticide and fertilizer
intensity. I believe that the socioeconomic effects of organic farming can be evaluated by examining the
relation between different socio-economic indicators and the rise in organic farming and also by estimating
the impact of organic farming on agricultural labor intensity.
Starting with the environmental questions, I inquire whether the increase in organic farming in a country
has led to lower rates of pesticide and fertilizer application per unit of land. Organic farmers are not allowed
to use pesticides or inorganic fertilizers; however, this positive impact would be lessened, if the conventional
farmers were to apply pesticide and fertilizer more intensively than before. Two possible explanations can
be given for such an outcome. First, the splitting of the agricultural sector into conventional and organic
farming could lead the two branches to drift further apart, making conventional farmers care even less than
before about their environmental impact11. Such an effect would also be accelerated by less interactions
between conventional and organic farmers (e.g. by not participating in the same associations, the two types
of farmers would be less likely to influence each other). A second explanation could be that pests might
be reappearing in areas where organic farming is rising in popularity. Conventional farmers in those areas
might apply more pesticide to face reappearing problems or even do so preemptively, because of the lack of
spillover effects from their neighbors. Thus, I am interested in the combined direct and spillover effects of
organic farming for an agricultural sector’s pesticide and fertilizer use.
Turning to the social implications of organic farming, I am interested in pinning down the factors that
predict the rise of organic farming. If organic farming were to be associated with the more affluent regions
of Europe, its impact as a catching-up device would undoubtedly be put into question. Furthermore, I
am interested in the impact of organic methods for labor intensity, in order to evaluate its potential for
employment generation. Since higher labor intensity in the agricultural sector would lead to higher demand
for agricultural labor, it becomes imperative in order to substantiate the claim that organic farming can act
as a device for strengthening rural communities and economies, both through direct employment generation
and through indirect multiplier effects.
I have compiled the dataset by
1. using publicly available data from the Eurostat website (accessed in the Spring of 2011).
2. augmenting the publicly available data with data from the Farm Structure Surveys conducted between
11However, if “organic” becomes visible and respectable, one could imagine a scenario in which even conventional farmers
would be influenced in a positive manner, even though they would not be willing to follow the strict organic regulations.
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2000 and 2007 (acquired through private correspondence with Eurostat in the Spring of 2010).
Unfortunately, for reasons of data availability, I am forced to use a different level of analysis for the
two types of questions. The section which deals with the environmental questions will rely mostly on the
publicly available data, which are predominantly country-level data. The section which deals with the social
consequences of organic farming will rely on the Farm Structure Survey data, which is district-level data12.
3.2 Methodology
The first way of assessing the environmental effectiveness of organic farming is to look at the impact of the
share of organic land on a country’s pesticide intensity. The latter is measured by the sales of pesticide (in
tonnes of active ingredient) per hectare of national utilized agricultural area. In order to express changes in
percentage terms, I apply a logarithmic transformation to pesticide intensity. Hence, I proceed to estimate
the following equation, where subscripts t and k denote year and country respectively:
logPesticideIntensitykt = β0 + β1 ×OrganicSharekt + β2 × Y earkt
+ β3 × logGDP kt + β4 × logGDPsquarekt
+ β5 × EUmembershipkt + β6 × SecondaryEducationkt
+ β7 ×Ginikt + β8 ×RegionalImbalanceskt
+ β9 ×%PermanentCropskt + ...+ β17 ×%NonClassifiedHoldingskt
+ bk0 + bk1 × Y earkt + kt
(1)
with k=1,...,27 countries and t=2000,...2007. Using vector and matrix notation, the model can be ex-
pressed as
log Pesticide Intensityk = Xkβ + Zkbk + k (2)
This is a mixed linear model: the regressors Xk include an intercept and I include both fixed parameters
β and zero-mean random parameters bk. I am allowing both for random intercepts and random slopes on
year, to allow for differences among different countries in their paths of pesticide use, rather than assuming
12The European Commission uses the NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) classification for dividing up
the territory of the EU for statistical purposes. The current NUTS classification divides the European territory into 97 regions
at the NUTS-1 level, 271 regions at the NUTS-2 level and 1303 regions at the NUTS-3 level (Eurostat, 2007, 10-11).
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the same rate of change overtime for all countries in my sample13.
I control for gross domestic product per capita (measured in 2000 prices) and also allow for a non-linear
relationship between pesticide intensity and GDP per capita by including a squared-GDP term. The rationale
for this inclusion is that, initially, as a country’s income grows, the intensity of pesticide use will increase, as
part of the process of catching-up. However, as the Environmental Kuznets Curve literature argues14, after
the attainment of a certain standard of living, environmental concerns will become more prominent, leading
to a decrease in the intensity of the environmentally harmful activity (pesticide use, in this case).
I decided to include a dummy variable for EU membership. This is possible since our data begins a
few years before some of the newer member states entered the EU15. Since the EU prides itself for its
environmental consciousness, it is interesting to check whether entering the EU per se has a significant
impact on environmental indicators16.
Following James Boyce’s work (Torras and Boyce, 1998; Boyce, 2002, 2006), I also assert that inequality
should play a key role in explaining environmental issues. I am going to use two separate (but obviously
related) indicators in order to capture inequality. The first one is the well-known Gini coefficient; the second
indicator captures regional imbalances, as measured by the sum of the absolute difference between regional
and national GDP per inhabitant, weighted by the share of population and expressed in percent of the
national per capita GDP17. Higher inequality could presumably lead to more intensive use of pesticides and
fertilizer in agriculture, both because of shorter planning horizons of the poor and of more industrial modes
of agriculture of the rich (easier mechanization, more use of pesticide rather than weeding).
I believe that it is also important to control for education (measured by the percentage of the population
which has finished secondary education). My hypothesis is that a more educated population will be less
willing to tolerate high rates of pesticide use. I also control for the share of different types of crops or activities
taking place in a given region, in order to capture crop-related differences in pesticide intensity. For this
purpose, I follow the categorizations employed by Eurostat in the Farm Structure Survey which classifies
agricultural holdings into the following activities: specialist fieldcrops, specialist horticulture, specialist
13Note that u0k has a similar interpretation to what econometricians refer to as fixed effects: it is the time invariant effect
for every different country.
14See Torras and Boyce (1998); Dinda (2004).
15The European Union grew from 12 to 27 members with subsequent enlargements in 1995, 2004 and 2007.
16There is hardly anything more striking than the following quote from an official document of the European Commission:
“Were we to represent Europe by a colour, that colour would undoubtedly be green”(European Commission, 1992, 7).
17Increases in both the Gini coefficient and the indicator of regional imbalances mean increases in inequality. However, the
country’s regional imbalances indicator can be zero if the regional income per capita is equal across all the country’s regions.
On the other hand, the Gini coefficient will also capture on the distribution of income within every region, hence differentiating
between two regions which report the same average income as a result of either equal or unequal distributions. Similarly, the
Gini coefficient doesn’t capture the geographical dimension of inequality among regions within a country, which we hope to
derive through the use of the regional imbalances indicator.
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permanent crops, specialist grazing land, specialist granivorous holdings, mixed cropping, mixed livestock,
mixed cropping and livestock, and non-classifiable holdings. In all the estimations to follow, specialist grazing
land will be the omitted activity (as it is the most common use of agricultural land in the EU).
The second environmental indicator that I am going to use is fertilizer intensity. I employ the same
methodology, utilizing a similar mixed linear model, in order to estimate the impact of a country’s share of
organic agriculture on fertilizer intensity. I expect the impact of organic farming on fertilizer intensity to be
negative, whereas I expect all other control variables to have the same sign as in the case of pesticide use,
for the reasons that have been outlined above:
logFertilizerIntensitykt = β0 + β1 ×OrganicSharekt + β2 × Y earkt
+ β3 × logGDP kt + β4 × logGDPsquarekt
+ β5 × EUmembershipkt + β6 × SecondaryEducationkt
+ β7 ×Ginikt + β8 ×RegionalImbalanceskt
+ β9 ×%PermanentCropskt + ...+ β17 ×%NonClassifiedHoldingskt
+ bk0 + bk1 × Y earkt + kt
(3)
Turning to the socio-economic results of organic farming, I use a hierarchical linear model with four levels
in order to estimate the determinants of a region’s share of organic agriculture. I make use of the fact that
each NUTS-2 region is nested within a NUTS-1 region, which in turn is nested within a country. Hence,
the share of organic farming in each of the different Farm Structure Surveys is the level 1 unit, NUTS-2
regions are the level 2 units, NUTS-1 regions are the level 3 units and countries are the level 4 units. I
am accounting for this clustering by introducing random effects at every level in the hierarchy. I am also
allowing the marginal effect of time on the dependent variable to vary randomly across different NUTS-2
regions, thus allowing every NUTS-2 region to have both random intercept and slope. Equation 4 presents
the general form of the estimated equation, whereas equation 5 presents the specification which includes all
control variables.
Organic Shareijkt = Xijktβ + Z
(4)
ijktb
(4)
k + Z
(3)
ijktb
(3)
jk + Z
(2)
ijktb
(2)
ijk + ijkt (4)
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OrganicShareijkt = β0 + β1 × Y earijkt + β2 × logAverageFarmSizeijkt
+ β3 ×%LFAijkt + β4 × logGDP ijkt + β5 × logGDPsquareijkt
+ β6 ×%RuralPopulationijkt + β7 ×%UrbanPopulationijkt
+ β8 ×%PermanentCropsijkt + ...+ β16 ×%NonClassifiedHoldingsijkt
+ b
(4)
k + b
(3)
jk + b
(2)
ijk0 + b
(2)
ijk1Y earijkt + ijkt
(5)
where t=2000, 2003, 2005, 2007, i=1,..., 271 NUTS-2 regions, j=1,..., 97 NUTS-1 regions, and k=1,....,
27 countries.
I proceed to ask what determines the share of organic farming in a region. If policy makers are right to
emphasize the connection between organic and small-scale farming, we should find a negative relationship
between a region’s average farm size and the region’s organic share of agriculture18. To capture potential
relationships between income and organic share, I control for the logarithm of GDP per capita - I am also
including a squared term to allow for non-linearities. In addition to income, I also control for a region’s
utilized agricultural area (UAA) that is classified as Least Favored (LFA). My initial hypothesis is that
the share of UAA which gets classified as LFA will have a positive impact on a region’s organic share: the
reason for this hypothesis is that LFAs are less likely to have undergone the transition to industrial forms
of agriculture. Hence, the transition towards organic methods might be easier from a technical standpoint.
I also control for the share of population living in rural and urban areas, omitting the share of population
living in intermediate areas. Finally, I control for crop and activity patterns, since some activities might be
more easily convertible into organic farming.
logLaborIntensityijkt = β0 + β1 × Y earijkt + β2 × logOrganicShareijkt
+ β3 ×AverageFarmSizeijkt + β4 ×%logGDP ijkt
+ β5 ×%RentedLandijkt + β6 ×%LFAijkt
+ β7 ×%PermanentCropsijkt + ...+ β15 ×%NonClassifiedHoldingsijkt
+ b
(4)
k + b
(3)
jk + b
(2)
ijk0 + b
(2)
ijk1Y earijkt + ijkt
(6)
18The connection between small farms and organic agriculture is taken, more or less, as given in much of the literature. See
Altieri (1987); Lynggaard (2006); van der Ploeg (2009).
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Finally, I want to estimate the impact on organic share on a region’s average labor intensity. I utilize a
similar hierarchical linear model in order to estimate the impact of a region’s organic share on the average
labor intensity of that region’s agricultural sector, hypothesizing that the share of organic land will have a
positive impact on labor intensity. Again, I control for the percentage of Least Favored Area and income19,
as well as for the region’s crop mix and the country, in which the specific region is located. I also control for
the average farm size and the percentage of rented land, as these might be indicators of structural differences
in the agricultural sectors of different regions (such as the extent of agricultural wage labor).
4 Environmental dimensions
4.1 Pesticide intensity
Figure 1 shows the development of pesticide intensity (measured as kilograms of active ingredient per hectare
of utilized agricultural area) in various European countries over the past two decades, whereas figure 2 shows
the relationship between the logarithm of pesticide intensity and GDP per capita. We notice that pesticide
intensity displays an inverted U-shape, which is consistent with the hypothesis of the environmental Kuznets
curve (see Boyce and Torras etc).
Table 1 presents our estimation results. We notice that the organic share of utilized agricultural land in
a country appears initially to have a positive impact on a country’s pesticide intensity: a 1% increase in the
country’s share of organic agriculture is related with an increase in pesticide application by 0.04-0.06%, ceteris
paribus. However, when I control for GDP per capita and GDP per capita square, this impact ceases being
statistically different from zero, even though it remains positive in all specifications. The year variable is
also positive, and statistically significant in specifications 2-5, showing an increase in pesticide intensity over
time. The regressions also point to the existence of an environmental Kuznets curve for pesticide intensity,
since the estimates for GDP and GDP-squared are positive and negative respectively, in addition to being
statistically significant at the 5% level in most specifications. There is no conclusive evidence regarding the
impact of EU membership and education. Interestingly, the Gini coefficient is associated with more intensive
pesticide use: this is a first indication that more unequal societies will demonstrate more intensive pesticide
use. On the other hand, the coefficient on regional imbalances doesn’t yield statistically significant estimates.
Finally, the presence of horticulture, permanent crops, and integrated cropping-livestock activities increases
19In this estimation, I do not include a squared term for income. There seems to be no theoretical reason why the relationship
between labor intensity and GDP would change direction after some level of income.
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Figure 1: Pesticide intensity in Europe, 1990-2007
Source: Eurostat
pesticide application ceteris paribus.
The positive relationship between organic share and pesticide intensity is puzzling. One plausible ex-
planation could be that conventional farmers use pesticides more intensively if their neighbors go organic,
either because they have to deal with more pests, or even preemptively, if they think that their neighbors
switch to organic might make them more vulnerable to pests. Hence, the negative direct impact of organic
farming on a country’s pesticide intensity (positive impact in environmental terms) is counterbalanced by an
indirect effect, which is negative in environmental terms. Another explanation could be that organic farming
is one among several options in the arsenal of environmental policy-makers for reducing pesticide intensity.
It is possible that there is some substitutability between those projects (in the sense that participation in
multiple programs requires going through different hoops of paperwork, control, etc, ). Thus, it might be
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Figure 2: Pesticide intensity and GDP per capita
Source: Eurostat
the case that participation in organic schemes is, in some cases, the “low-hanging fruit”, and that higher
reductions in a country’s pesticide intensity can be achieved through programs directly targeting pesticide
use, even if they do not banish pesticides altogether, as organic farming does.
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Table 1: Determinants of pesticide intensity - Mixed Effects Regression
Reg11 Reg12 Reg13 Reg14 Reg15 Reg16 Reg17 Reg18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share of Organic Land .055 .043 .006 .014 .019 .010 .006 .038
(.015)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.017) (.017) (.018) (.020) (.022) (.025)
Year .016 .025 .019 .033 .018 .021 .010
(.008)∗ (.010)∗∗ (.011)∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.013) (.014) (.016)
Log(GDP) 14.994 11.842 10.570 6.973 7.473 13.602
(3.795)∗∗∗ (4.297)∗∗∗ (4.369)∗∗ (4.927) (5.236) (6.010)∗∗
Log(GDP)-sq -.767 -.602 -.540 -.344 -.372 -.668
(.202)∗∗∗ (.228)∗∗∗ (.231)∗∗ (.259) (.274) (.309)∗∗
EU membership .154 .193 .001 -.008 -.170
(.112) (.115)∗ (.156) (.171) (.178)
Education -.015 -.009 -.010 -.003
(.007)∗∗ (.008) (.009) (.009)
Gini coefficient .034 .035 .046
(.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
Regional Imbalances -.002 5.50e-06
(.014) (.013)
% Fieldcrops .370
(.952)
% Horticulture 52.128
(17.301)∗∗∗
% Permanent Crops 5.115
(3.042)∗
% Granivorous Crops -3.922
(4.522)
% Mixed cropping -2.449
(3.753)
% Mixed livestock 3.711
(4.124)
% Mixed crop-livestock 6.672
(2.526)∗∗∗
% Non-classifiable -.037
(3.144)
N 110 110 110 110 110 89 86 86
χ2 13.796 17.683 41.267 43.749 48.293 26.978 26.519 51.042
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Table 2: Determinants of fertilizer intensity - Mixed Effects Regression
Reg21 Reg22 Reg23 Reg24 Reg25 Reg26 Reg27 Reg28
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share of Organic Land -.029 -.012 -.016 -.014 -.015 -.015 -.035 -.034
(.007)∗∗∗ (.008) (.008)∗ (.009) (.009)∗ (.010) (.011)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗
Year -.018 -.028 -.029 -.031 -.030 -.021 -.026
(.004)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗ (.011)∗∗
Log(GDP) -.577 -2.324 -2.095 -2.850 6.744 4.863
(2.247) (2.747) (2.786) (3.098) (3.535)∗ (3.926)
Log(GDP)-sq .060 .147 .136 .176 -.336 -.246
(.119) (.143) (.145) (.161) (.185)∗ (.205)
EU membership .676 .640 .713 -.209 .130
(.626) (.636) (.657) (.508) (.608)
Education .002 .001 .008 .009
(.005) (.005) (.004)∗ (.006)
Gini coefficient -.002 -.004 .001
(.008) (.008) (.008)
Regional Imbalances -.0007 -.0007
(.007) (.007)
% Fieldcrops .047
(.536)
% Horticulture 22.008
(9.057)∗∗
% Permanent Crops .081
(1.542)
% Granivorous Crops 1.472
(2.780)
% Mixed cropping -.509
(2.024)
% Mixed livestock -2.564
(2.109)
% Mixed crop-livestock .224
(1.212)
% Non-classifiable -.556
(1.005)
N 93 93 93 93 93 79 70 70
χ2 16.175 38.035 56.945 58.385 57.893 48.589 66.872 73.806
4.2 Fertilizer intensity
Figures 3 and 4 present the development of fertilizer intensity after 1997, as well as its relationship with
GDP per capita. The obvious outlier is Luxembourg, which illustrates the logic of industrial agriculture
at its extreme. Luxembourg has also been recently condemned by the European Court of Justice for not
complying with the EU’s Nitrates Directive (European Commision, 2010).
Table 2 presents the results of the regression estimating the impact of organic farming on fertilizer
use. We notice that the share of land under organic methods of production has a negative impact on
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Figure 3: Fertilizer intensity in Europe, 1997-2006
Source: Eurostat
fertilizer intensity, statistically significant in most specifications. A 1% increase in a country’s organic share
is associated with a fall in its overall fertilizer intensity by 0.02-0.04%. The coefficient of the time variable is
negative and statistically significant, suggesting a decrease of fertilizer intensity over time. The coefficients
on GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared are inconclusive: they are statistically significant in only
one out of six specifications and they suggest an inverted U-shape between fertilizer intensity and per
capita income; however, this result cannot support any strong claims about a relationship between income
and fertilizer intensity. The same holds for the other controls: EU membership, and the two measures of
inequality are not statistically significant in any estimations, whereas the percentage of population having
completed secondary education is positive and statistically significant in only one specification. Finally, the
only agricultural activity which shows a statistically significant impact on fertilizer intensity is horticulture:
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Figure 4: Fertilizer intensity and GDP per capita
Source: Eurostat
a 1% increase in the share of land devoted to horticulture would increase fertilizer intensity by 22%.
Interpreting the results of the regression from an environmental standpoint, it is encouraging that the
impact of organic share on fertilizer intensity is negative: this means that the growth in organic farming
does in fact have an environmentally beneficial impact on the country’s fertilizer intensity, beyond and in
addition to the overall trend of limiting fertilizer use. Such a result can also be explained by the lack of
obvious spillover effects: compared to pesticides, it is more unlikely that a farmer will apply more fertilizer
because her neighbor switched to organic methods of production. Among the different impacts of farming
activities on the environment, I would like to point out the impact of horticulture on fertilizer (and pesticide)
intensity. Welcome though it may be, the switch to organic methods is hardly a panacea for environmental
problems, especially if organic farming is associated with the least intensive activities, such as grazing. Hence,
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in order to tackle the environmental problems of European agriculture, it becomes imperative to lessen the
ramifications of the most intensive agricultural activities (such as European horticulture).
5 Socioeconomic dimensions
5.1 Where does organic farming become prominent?
As figure 5 shows, the area under organic methods has grown rapidly in the European Union during the
first decade of the 21st century. However, a look at table 3 reveals that the number of organic farms hasn’t
followed the same path. At least in several EU countries, the number of organic farmers has stagnated, or
even decreased as compared to 10-15 years ago.
Figure 5: Organic area in the EU - 2000 to 2007 (Source: Eurostat)
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Table 3: Number of organic farms, by country
1985 1990 1993 1995 1997 2000 2003 2005 2007
AT 420 1539 9713 18542 19996 18880 17880 18760 18200
BE 50 160 160 193 291 580 530 550 490
CZ NA 30 132 187 192 NA 510 600 750
DK 130 523 640 1050 1617 2520 2600 2440 2110
FI 60 671 1599 2793 4381 4900 4280 4020 3620
FR 2500 2700 3231 3538 4784 7060 8610 9010 8910
DE 1610 4188 11248 15055 12368 9570 11420 13480 13580
EL NA 25 165 568 2514 1460 7550 9610 27700
IR 8 150 162 378 808 1560 670 590 610
IT 600 1500 4656 10630 30844 45710 38470 41000 39140
LU 10 10 12 19 23 20 40 50 50
NL 215 399 455 561 810 710 1140 1190 1160
PT 1 50 90 331 278 810 900 880 1190
ES 264 350 753 1042 3526 17160 10270 14450 15920
SE 150 1859 1876 4206 10869 9040 15040 2810 2940
UK 300 700 655 828 1026 1690 2750 2900 3210
Source: Michelsen (2001), Eurostat
As explained in section 3, I utilize a hierarchical linear model in order to estimate the determinants of the
share of organic farming in the different regions of Europe. Since the Farm Structure Survey has included
questions about organic farming only since 2000, I only have relevant regional data from the last 4 surveys,
which were conducted in 2000, 2003, 2005 and 2007.
The main relationship of interest in my analysis is between the share of organic land and the average
farm size of the region. The estimation results point to a positive relationship between organic share and
average farm size (statistically significant in all but one specification). Hence a 1% increase in average farm
size is associated with a rise in organic share by about 0.01%; a doubling in the average farm size is related
with an increase in the share of organic land by approximately 1%, ceteris paribus. As one can see, the
coefficient on the year variable is positive and statistically significant in the first four specifications, but its
impact becomes less clear when I add controls for the percentage of rural and urban population in a region.
The percent of least favored area in a region doesn’t seem to have a significant impact on a region’s organic
share. Neither per capita income nor the breakdown of rural/urban breakdown of population seems to have a
strong relationship with the popularity of organic. Finally, a higher share of permanent crops in the region’s
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agricultural area seems to be correlated with a higher share of organic farming (a 1% increase in the share
of permanent crops is correlated with a rise in organic land by 0.05%, ceteris paribus), whereas field crops
seem to be correlated with less organic farmland (a 1% increase in the share of field crops is related with a
drop in organic land by 0.02%).
Table 4: Determinants of organic share - Hierarchical model
Reg31 Reg32 Reg33 Reg34 Reg35 Reg36 Reg37
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average Farmsize .010 .009 .009 .008 .008 .005 .009
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003) (.004)∗∗
Year .002 .002 .002 .002 -.0002 -.0005
(.0004)∗∗∗ (.0004)∗∗∗ (.0004)∗∗∗ (.0004)∗∗∗ (.0007) (.0007)
% LFA .011 .009 -.002 -.0003
(.019) (.019) (.021) (.021)
Log(GDP) .100 .119 .093
(.074) (.080) (.082)
Log(GDP)-sq -.005 -.006 -.005
(.004) (.004) (.004)
% Rural population .012 .011
(.008) (.008)
% Urban population -.008 -.006
(.007) (.008)
% Fieldcrops -.020
(.012)∗
% Horticulture -.056
(.113)
% Permanent Crops .054
(.025)∗∗
% Granivorous Crops -.140
(.114)
% Mixed cropping .026
(.053)
% Mixed livestock -.084
(.068)
% Mixed crop-livestock -.033
(.029)
% Non-classifiable .016
(.057)
N 975 975 975 953 951 709 709
χ2 13.807 31.504 31.504 30.455 33.079 14.203 31.539
Obviously, it is difficult to find some all-encompassing variables that explain the rise of organic farming
in places with very diverse political, economic, and specifically agricultural, histories. However, the fact that
regions with a larger average farm size are more likely to have a higher share of organic agriculture disproves
the assumed association of organic farms with small farm size and presents us with a more complicated reality
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than what policy makers or environmentalists often assume to exist. If organic farming is more prevalent
in regions with larger average farm size, the association between small farms and organic methods doesn’t
seem to be as natural as often assumed.
5.2 Labor intensity
Organic farming is often assumed to be inextricably interwoven with high labor intensity20. Thus, organic
farming is presented as a tool for keeping people in the countryside. Whether the switch towards organic
practices actually has a significant impact on a region’s agricultural employment needs to be shown. Hence,
it becomes necessary to inquire whether organic farming does impact a region’s agricultural labor intensity
in a positive manner.
Table 5 provides a first approximation of the research question, by comparing labor intensity at the
country level (measured as annual work units per hectare) for conventional and organic farms. We notice
that organic farms display higher labor intensity than conventional farms only in the cases of France and
Luxembourg (in Austria, Cyprus and Ireland that ceased to be the case during the last decade). Hence, I
proceed to examine the relationship between labor intensity and organic share of agriculture at the regional
level, while controlling for other characteristics.
Table 6 presents the results of the estimated hierarchical linear model. Contrary to my hypothesis,
we notice the persistence of a strong negative relation between a region’s organic share and its average
agricultural labor intensity (a 1% increase in organic share is related with a drop in a region’s agricultural
labor intensity by 0.28-0.77%). Any negative effects of the year coefficient disappear when controlling for
GDP per capita. As expected, there is a strong negative relationship between a region’s average farm size
and its average labor intensity; smaller farms are more likely to apply labor more intensively (a 1% decrease
in average farm size is related with a rise in labor intensity by approximately 0.62-0.68%). Additionally,
the coefficient on GDP per capita shows that richer areas will display lower agricultural labor intensity.
The extent of rental arrangements on land increases average labor intensity, probably because less land is
idle, whereas more Least Favored Agricultural Area means less intensively used land. Finally, horticulture,
permanent crops, granivorous cropping and mixed livestock activities mean a more intensive use of land than
grazing land.
20See van der Ploeg et al. (2002) or van der Ploeg (2009) for illustrations of analysis which equates organic farming with
peasant processes.
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Table 5: Labor intensity per hectare, by type of farm
2000 2003 2005 2007
Conv Org Conv Org Conv Org Conv Org
EU-27 0.064 0.033
EU-25 0.057 0.034 0.054 0.033
EU-15 0.045 0.034 0.046 0.032 0.044 0.034 0.042 0.032
Austria 0.052 0.056 0.053 0.055 0.050 0.049 0.050 0.049
Belgium 0.052 0.042 0.050 0.041 0.048 0.037 0.046 0.026
Bulgaria 0.26 0.22 0.15 0.11
Cyprus 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.14
Czech Rep. 0.043 0.016 0.040 0.015 0.038 0.017
Denmark 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.019 0.022 0.019 0.020 0.019
Estonia 0.046 0.024 0.043 0.023 0.035 0.022
Finland 0.044 0.037 0.041 0.034 0.035 0.030 0.030 0.026
France 0.031 0.040 0.030 0.034 0.028 0.031 0.026 0.032
Germany 0.035 0.033 0.038 0.032 0.035 0.029 0.033 0.029
Greece 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.087 0.13 0.079 0.12 0.079
Hungary 0.12 0.035 0.11 0.032 0.092 0.028
Ireland 0.037 0.040 0.037 0.039 0.035 0.033 0.035 0.030
Italy 0.092 0.050 0.10 0.055 0.097 0.060 0.092 0.046
Latvia 0.10 0.14 0.092 0.052 0.079 0.044 0.059 0.039
Lithuania 0.087 0.065 0.077 0.042 0.067 0.027
Luxembourg 0.034 0.039 0.030 0.033 0.030 0.031 0.028 0.034
Malta 0.41 0.39 0.41
Netherlands 0.095 0.067 0.086 0.050 0.082 0.062 0.079 0.072
Poland 0.15 0.15 0.077 0.14 0.062
Portugal 0.12 0.016 0.11 0.013 0.10 0.014 0.091 0.018
Romania 0.18 0.17 0.017 0.15 0.057
Slovakia 0.061 0.027 0.054 0.020 0.051 0.021 0.045 0.020
Slovenia 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.16 0.085
Spain 0.033 0.021 0.032 0.016 0.032 0.021 0.032 0.018
Sweden 0.023 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.016 0.020 0.015
UK 0.021 0.013 0.021 0.016 0.020 0.014 0.020 0.016
Source: Eurostat
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Table 6: Determinants of average labor intensity - Hierarchical model
Reg41 Reg42 Reg43 Reg44 Reg45 Reg46 Reg47
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
% Organic area -.767 -.488 -.279 -.285 -.321 -.310 -.282
(.133)∗∗∗ (.121)∗∗∗ (.116)∗∗ (.111)∗∗ (.111)∗∗∗ (.113)∗∗∗ (.112)∗∗
Year -.018 -.004 -.0004 -.0003 8.89e-06 -.002
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Average Farmsize -.680 -.643 -.649 -.657 -.624
(.022)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗
Log(GDP) -.222 -.229 -.198 -.172
(.042)∗∗∗ (.041)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.041)∗∗∗
% Rental arrangements .140 .140 .188
(.058)∗∗ (.060)∗∗ (.059)∗∗∗
% LFA -.241 -.174
(.075)∗∗∗ (.075)∗∗
% Fieldcrops .034
(.073)
% Horticulture 3.566
(.539)∗∗∗
% Permanent Crops .449
(.148)∗∗∗
% Granivorous Crops 1.537
(.440)∗∗∗
% Mixed cropping -.121
(.218)
% Mixed livestock .700
(.259)∗∗∗
% Mixed crop-livestock -.031
(.118)
% Non-classifiable holdings -.430
(.128)∗∗∗
N 966 966 966 964 964 942 942
χ2 33.082 213.111 1200.276 1122.941 1132.656 1132.714 1376.803
6 Discussion
The preceding sections cast doubt on the effectiveness of organic farming for achieving both the environmental
and the socio-economic objectives that they are purported to assist. Our analysis shows that there is a
strong relationship between a higher share of organic farming and lower application of fertilizer in a country.
However, the picture is less clear when it comes to pesticides, as a higher share of organic land is not correlated
with less intensive pesticide use in our sample. Pesticide intensity seems to have a relationship with income
which follows the patterns of the Environmental Kuznets Curve, where more unequal countries display higher
rates of pesticide use (controlling for income). Finally, among the various agricultural activities, horticulture
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has the most stark results on both pesticide and fertilizer intensity.
I believe that these environmental results point to the limitations of organic farming as a transformative
force. Beyond the need for further-reaching policies which would include addressing inequality, they invite
us to rethink the level at which sustainability is to be conceptualized. The European agricultural policies
have so far focused on convincing individual farmers to switch to organic methods; however, if the actions of
conventional farmers effectively counteract the positive environmental impact of organic farmers, the pressure
on a region’s ecosystems will hardly be lessened. Thus, I argue that the question of transition towards organic
farming (and towards more sustainable production processes, in general) needs to treat entire regions, rather
than individual farmers, as subjects21.
Even if we consider the environmental results to be mixed, the socio-economic results portray an even
less optimistic picture. The data points to a positive relationship between a region’s share of organic land
and the region’s average farm size. This result, which disproves the idea that organic farming is “naturally”
intertwined with small-scale farming, can be explained in a variety of ways. Even if small producers are less
likely to follow intensive methods of production, their transition towards certified organic methods requires
a series of conditions that they cannot necessarily secure as easily as larger farms (such as access to markets
or credit). Additionally, since agricultural officials are measuring the success of agri-environmental projects
by land coverage as a share of utilized agricultural area, it is easier and faster to achieve their targets by
the transition of a few large producers, rather than by many small ones. Hence, organic farms are not
representative farms, which might be why agricultural labor intensity does not increase as a result of the rise
in the share of organic land. Instead, as I show, labor intensity is lower in regions which have larger organic
sectors, controlling for a series of other factors.
What the previous statistical analysis does not (and possibly cannot) show, is the transformations which
occur in rural Europe. The growth of organic farming, in many cases, does not result from farmers deciding
to switch into organic. It comes through the consolidation of holdings which were previously conventional
and the exit of farmers from production.
Table 7 displays the trends in the numbers of organic producers and organic land in Europe during the
2000s. The elements on the diagonal represent regions which experienced a positive relationship between
the number of producers and their land, whereas the upper off-diagonal elements represent regions in which
organic farmers are under pressure. The lower off-diagonal elements display the existence of an unambiguous
21The Bioregionen in Austria are good examples of cases where each farmer’s decision to switch towards organic farming is
treated as part of a larger plan of the community to achieve sustainability. For more on these initiatives, see Schermer (2003,
2008).
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process of concentration of organic land22. Thus, in 30 regions the number of organic farmers decreases while
organic land increases, whereas in 7 other regions organic land either increases with the number of organic
producers unchanged or the number of organic farmers decreases with organic area unchanged. Hence, in
a significant number of regions, “rise in organic farming” means a rise in the organic share of agricultural
land, without a rise in the number of organic producers. Such a development puts in question the longevity
of the “organic movement” and its potential for influencing agricultural practices. Contrary to popular
misconception which equates organic with “doing nothing” (because nature presumably does everything),
organic farming is a knowledge-intensive activity, which is based on constant experimentation (Kummer and
Vogl, 2009; Milestad et al., 2010). Hence, the proliferation and the deepening of organic practices become
precarious unless they are widespread among a large number of farmers.
Table 7: Regional trends, 2000-2007
Organic land
Organic producers Increase Unchanged Decrease
Increase 161 1 4
Unchanged 4 17 5
Decrease 30 3 43
Table 8 shows the rapid changes that occurred in the agricultural sectors of selected regions of Europe,
which experienced an increase of organic land during the first years of the 21st century. We notice that in all
these areas, there is a dramatic decrease in the numbers of conventional producers and in the area taken out
of conventional production. However, the number of organic producers does not increase significantly (and
in some cases even goes down) in those areas. Hence, part of the area taken out of conventional production
is converted into organic land; however, that process is concomitant with a process of concentration of land
into fewer hands.
I present more evidence of the discrepancy between conventional and organic farms in the statistical
appendix, in tables A.1, A.2 and A.3. Whereas the average organic farm size in the EU-27 is 40.4 ha, the
average conventional farm size is 12.3 ha, a pattern which is present in all European countries. Additionally,
organic farms are more likely than conventional farms to assume a corporate legal status (5.2% of organic
farms are corporate entities, compared to only 1.9%), and to rent land additionally to the land they own
22Such a process can be occurring even if both organic producers and organic land are moving in the same direction, as is
the case in most regions.
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Table 8: Changes in selected regions, 2000-2007
Region Change in Or-
ganic Producers
Change in Or-
ganic Land
Change in
Conventional
Producers
Change in Con-
ventional Land
Luxembourg (BE34) 10 2,500 -990 -1,940
Yugozoitchen (BG34) 20 1,220 -33,530 -21,440
Central (CZ06) 10 16,790 -2,080 -21,500
Freiburg (DE13) -90 6,240 -5,360 -22,080
Kassel (DE73) -10 4,410 -3,460 -3,210
Hovedstaden (DK01) 10 2,200 -220 -5,340
Castile-La Mancha (ES42) -260 7,990 -25,010 -105,480
Extremadura (ES43) -1,360 39,850 -12,540 -259,330
Balearic Islands (ES53) -10 3,960 -1,920 -30,000
Brittany (FR52) -50 7,120 -13,510 -50,580
Auvergne (FR72) 10 4,860 -5,780 -16,300
Central Hungary (HU10) -170 8,290 -19,660 -19,610
Northern Great Plain (HU32) -150 27,550 -71,280 -57,010
Southern Great Plain (HU33) -290 9,950 -74,880 -113,320
Southern and Eastern (IE02) 0 1,870 -2,670 32,330
Sicily (ITG1) -1,980 57,230 -56,400 -61,290
Flevoland (NL23) 40 4,690 -380 -7,910
Alentejo (PT18) 30 18,690 -17,370 -269,310
Eastern Slovakia (SK04) 60 38,660 -490 -128,830
Northern Ireland (UKN0) -40 560 -3700 -36,420
(42.1% of organic farms rent land, whereas only 16.9% of conventional farms do), both of which are elements
associated with a capitalist organization of production. Finally, as table A.4 shows, average labor power
(measured in terms of annual full-time equivalent) is larger in organic farms, despite the lower labor intensity
per hectare. Interestingly, these differences are present in all countries of Europe. Hence, the assertion that
the results are driven by either the former socialist countries, which experienced structural transformations
in the 1990s, or by countries, with a feudalist agrarian past, is rendered highly improbable.
There are several ways to interpret these results. One way, which is consistent with Marxist literature,
is to speak of a phenomenon that points to concentration and centralization of capital (Panitsidis, 1992;
Liodakis, 1994; Economakis, 2000; Tolios, 2009). Basically, the claim made by these authors is that the
CAP attempts to facilitate the penetration of capital in the agricultural sector, a phenomenon predicted by
Kautsky (1988) and Lenin (2004). Consequently, even if they assert the protection of the family farm as their
political priority, all policies falling under the CAP ultimately support capitalist structures and attempt to
create these, when they don’t exist. Hence, the support for organic farms should be considered, more or less,
a pretense for the further intrusion of capital in the agricultural sector.
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Another way, which is consistent with development literature and which avoids attributing bad intentions
to those designing and implementing the CAP, would be to think in terms of technology diffusion23. Drawing
lessons from the Green Revolution, one could argue that, for reasons of higher income, access to credit,
political power, education, and ability to take risks, large farmers are more likely to differentiate partly or
to transition wholly to organic production earlier than small farmers. Institutional biases, such as minimum
land requirements for a holding to be certified as organic, might accentuate those biases and, by conferring
first-mover advantages to the large farmers, exclude the smaller farmers from switching over to organic
production, even after the removal of those obstacles.
In fact, these two approaches, are in some ways not completely antithetical; one could argue that the
characteristics of the large farmer, described by the development literature, could accelerate the processes
of concentration and centralization. In the absence of strong farmers’ associations or local food networks,
small organic farmers cannot establish their position as easily as larger ones. Certification is more expensive
for smaller farms in comparison to larger ones, allowing them to retain a smaller part of the subsidy they
receive. If they do not associate with other organic farmers, they still have to pay high interest rates to
banks, and high procurement prices to input providers, while their access to the markets is not guaranteed,
because of their small volume of production. To give an example of the latter, Greek organic farmers often
resort to selling their organic production as conventional, because the small number of organic merchants
in the country do not want to deal with small volumes of products. Furthermore, larger farms are more
likely to be able to afford the services of agronomists specialized in tackling production problems associated
with organic farming. In the absence of the technical (and even psychological) support of a community of
other organic farmers, the small producers are likely to be discouraged, exiting production and selling their
land(Konstantinidis, 2011). The fact that several regions experience either a decrease or stagnation in the
number of organic farmers points to the inability of the adoption/diffusion framework, while the persistence
of significant differences in the economic characteristics of the different types of farms, points to institutional
factors that act as barriers to entry for smaller farmers.
I believe that the results presented in the previous sections confront European policy-makers with a
serious problem. They challenge the idea that small farms, who theoretically should be presented with fewer
problems than larger farms for the transition to (certified) organic processes, actually take advantage of the
new policies. Hence, it becomes difficult to articulate the claim that the discrepancy between organic and
conventional farms is a temporary phenomenon, happening for reasons advanced by the adoption/diffusion
23See, for example, Feder and O’Mara (1981) or Albrecht (1974).
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framework, which would be ameliorated over time with the growing appearance of organic methods. The
same institutional factors allow larger farms to generate super-profits and also to receive surplus transfers
in the form of pecuniary transfers for the provision of environmental services. Thus, the organic sector
develops forms of production which deviate more and more from the social and environmental ideals of
the more radical segments of the organic movement. Hence, the creation of large farms which specialize in
monocultures and sell in distant markets, but abstain from using chemicals and pesticides, is evidence of the
“conventionalization” of organic farming.
7 Concluding remarks
Industrial agriculture proved to be incompatible with citizens’ demand for quality of life and provision
of safe food. Organic agriculture can provide society with a solution to many of the problems created
by intensive methods of agricultural production. However, and despite the strong support of European
agricultural policies, my analysis shows that the rise of organic agriculture in Europe has fallen short of
producing the socio-economic benefits which policy-makers and environmentalists generally associate with
it. Organic methods seem to be connected with larger farms, both in terms of land size and in terms of labor,
disproving the association between small-scale, family farming and organic methods, which is often held as
an axiomatic truth. Finally, organic farming in Europe has not contributed to increases in the labor intensity
of the agricultural sector, casting doubts on the efficacy of organic farming for increasing labor demand in
marginalized communities and acting as an effective tool for keeping rural residents in the countryside.
The problem, however, does not lie in organic farming per se. European agricultural policies have
measured success in a region’s transformation towards “greener” methods in agriculture by the share of
organic land in its utilized agricultural area, while treating social dimensions as mechanically derivative of
the growth in organic farming. Thus, the failure of these rural development policies to fulfill their social goals
is unsurprising. One element that these policies failed to recognize is the significance of strong agricultural
cooperatives and other effective forms of farmers’ associations. The latter would empower small farmers,
helping them to avoid paying large rents to certifiers, finance and input providers and merchants, while
providing them with the economic and technical support to compete effectively against larger-scale farms.
At the same time, these forms of organization could effectively enforce high standards in the treatment of
labor, while moving towards more ecologically sustainable methods of production.
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A Statistical Appendix
Table A.1: Size of average farm
2000 2003 2005 2007
Conv Org Conv Org Conv Org Conv Org
EU-27 12.3 40.4
EU-25 15.7 42.4 16.4 40.6
EU-15 18.4 33.4 19.3 40.1 20.5 39.8 21.2 38
Austria 16.7 20.0 18.4 21.3 18.7 22.9 18.9 22.3
Belgium 22.4 43.0 25.2 43.8 26.7 45.3 28.4 52.9
Bulgaria 4.4 5.1 64.3 6.2 84.7
Cyprus 3.5 5.6 3.3 6.2 3.6 8.0
Czech Rep. 75.7 402.6 79.7 398.6 84.5 334.6
Denmark 45.3 56 54.2 63.3 52.0 61.5 59.2 68.3
Estonia 21.1 86.6 28.9 70.2 37.4 73.3
Finland 27.1 31.4 29.7 34.2 31.8 36.3 33.3 39.7
France 41.9 46.9 45.1 56.5 48.5 60.2 52.0 59.8
Germany 36.0 51.1 40.8 55.2 43.2 56.4 45.2 58.5
Greece 4.4 4.8 4.7 11.7 4.7 12.9 4.5 10.7
Hungary 4.6 68.8 5.4 197.6 5.7 193.0 6.5 350.3
Ireland 31.5 26.8 31.7 29.3 31.8 34.2 32.2 38.3
Italy 5.8 18.0 6.4 19.6 7.0 21.5 7.2 24.3
Latvia 10.3 7.6 11.6 36.3 13.0 64.8 15.7 44.8
Lithuania 9.1 90.6 10.9 41.7 11.1 71.0
Luxembourg 45.3 51.5 52.3 52.8 52.6 58.2 56.8 63.8
Malta 1.0 0.9 0.9
Netherlands 19.9 30.7 23.0 58.4 23.7 40.4 24.7 42.8
Poland 5.9 23.0 6.4 25.4
Portugal 9.0 145.8 10.0 157.7 10.9 172.0 12.1 127.1
Romania 3.1 3.3 143.2 3.5 19.0
Slovakia 29.7 854.8 28.6 1402 26.7 737.4 26.5 588.1
Slovenia 5.6 8.6 6.2 13.9 6.3 15.9
Spain 20.1 40.1 21.7 67.8 22.6 55.2 23.3 57.9
Sweden 36.0 51.4 44.7 50.8 40.3 89.9 40.6 97.4
UK 66.6 222.1 56.1 187.6 54.4 177.9 52.7 154.0
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Table A.2: Percent of corporate farms
2000 2003 2005 2007
Conv Org Conv Org Conv Org Conv Org
EU-27 1.9 5.2
EU-25 2.4 5.4 2.5 5.2
EU-15 2.7 4 2.9 4.7 3.5 5.3 3.7 5.2
Table A.3: Percent of farms renting land
2000 2003 2005 2007
Conv Org Conv Org Conv Org Conv Org
EU-27 16.9 42.1
EU-25 22.6 42.4 23.6 42.5
EU-15 24.9 37.2 27.5 46.3 22.6 42.4 23.6 42.5
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Table A.4: Average labor (annual full time equivalent), by type of farm
2000 2003 2005 2007
Conv Org Conv Org Conv Org Conv Org
EU-27 0.78 1.32
EU-25 0.89 1.44 0.89 1.32
EU-15 0.84 1.12 0.89 1.30 0.90 1.37 0.88 1.23
Austria 0.88 1.12 0.97 1.18 0.93 1.13 0.95 1.1
Belgium 1.17 1.56 1.27 1.74 1.29 1.55 1.30 1.42
Bulgaria 1.15 1.12 2 0.95 3
Cyprus 0.64 1.1 0.56 1.38 0.60 1.14
Czech Rep. 3.37 6.4 3.33 6.22 3.36 5.73
Denmark 1.1 1.23 1.2 1.23 1.13 1.14 1.2 1.26
Estonia 0.99 1.97 1.28 1.59 1.33 1.59
Finland 1.21 1.16 1.23 1.14 1.11 1.10 0.99 1.03
France 1.28 1.87 1.33 1.90 1.34 1.90 1.35 1.92
Germany 1.26 1.66 1.56 1.77 1.51 1.66 1.49 1.68
Greece 0.63 0.74 0.62 1.02 0.61 1.02 0.56 0.84
Hungary 0.65 6.91 0.63 6.91 0.62 9.52
Ireland 1.16 1.06 1.16 1.15 1.12 1.12 1.13 1.16
Italy 0.53 0.91 0.67 1.08 0.70 1.30 0.69 1.11
Latvia 1.01 1.06 1.07 1.86 1.03 2.86 0.94 1.76
Lithuania 0.79 5.64 0.85 1.77 0.76 1.89
Luxembourg 1.55 2 1.58 1.75 1.58 1.80 1.59 2.20
Malta 0.41 0.37 0.38
Netherlands 1.91 2.06 2.02 2.89 1.95 2.48 1.95 2.97
Poland 0.89 1.77 0.92 1.57
Portugal 1.14 2.34 1.16 2.08 1.14 2.35 1.14 2.29
Romania 0.56 0.57 2.29 0.52 0.87
Slovakia 1.85 20 1.58 21.8 1.38 15.6 1.24 12.2
Slovenia 1.20 1.36 1.16 1.45 1.06 1.36
Spain 0.66 0.83 0.70 1.06 0.74 1.16 0.75 1.04
Sweden 0.86 1.08 0.98 1.05 0.88 1.41 0.85 1.47
UK 1.43 2.90 1.17 3.06 1.10 2.49 1.04 2.45
Source: Eurostat
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